Federal Communications Law
Journal
Volume 59

Issue 2

Article 5

3-2007

The Telecommunications Economy and Regulation as Coevolving
Complex Adaptive Systems: Implications for Federalism
Barbara A. Cherry
Indiana University

Follow this and additional works at: https://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/fclj
Part of the Administrative Law Commons, Antitrust and Trade Regulation Commons, Communications
Law Commons, and the Legislation Commons

Recommended Citation
Cherry, Barbara A. (2007) "The Telecommunications Economy and Regulation as Coevolving Complex
Adaptive Systems: Implications for Federalism," Federal Communications Law Journal: Vol. 59 : Iss. 2 ,
Article 5.
Available at: https://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/fclj/vol59/iss2/5

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by
the Law School Journals at Digital Repository @ Maurer
Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Federal
Communications Law Journal by an authorized editor of
Digital Repository @ Maurer Law. For more information,
please contact rvaughan@indiana.edu.

The Telecommunications Economy
and Regulation as Coevolving
Complex Adaptive Systems:
Implications for Federalism
Barbara A. Cherry*
I. INTRODUCTION .............................................................................

370

II. LIMITS OF THE PRESENT POLICY PARADIGM FOR SUSTAINABLE

PO LICIES .......................................................................................
373
III. TOWARD A NEW PARADIGM FOR SUSTAINABLE POLICIES .......... 374

A.

General Constraints and Properties of Sustainable
Policies..................................................................................
376
B. Relations of Telecommunications Policy to Complexity
Theory ...................................................................................
379
1. Complexity Theory .........................................................
379
2. Economic Sectors and Policymaking Systems as
Coevolving Complex Adaptive Systems ......................... 382
C. General Implicationsfor Sustainable Telecommunications
Policiesfrom a Complex Systems Perspective...................... 384
1V. FEDERALISM

AS

AN

INNOVATIVE

AND

DYNAMIC

POLICYM AKING SYSTEM ..............................................................
385
V. HISTORICAL EVOLUTION OF FEDERALISM IN THE US ................. 386
VI. PRESSURES FOR A NEW FEDERALISM MODEL IN THE US ........... 388

Professor, Department of Telecommunications, Indiana University; Ph.D., Department of
Communication Studies, Northwestern University; J.D., Harvard Law School; M.A. in
Economics and Law, Harvard University; B.S. in Economics, University of Michigan;
formerly, Senior Counsel, Office of Strategic Planning and Policy Analysis, Federal
Communications Commission.
*

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS LA W JOURNAL
VII.

[Vol. 59

USING COMPLEXITY THEORY FOR EVOLUTION OF A NEW

FEDERALISM M ODEL ....................................................................

389

A. Recognizing Federalismas a PatchingAlgorithm ............... 390
B. Modifying Federalismfor EnvironmentalRegulation.......... 394
C. ComparingModels of Policy Reform.................................... 396
D. Using Adaptive Decision-Making Tools for Policymaking
398
in General .............................................................................
VIII.

TOWARD A REVISION OF FEDERALISM FOR SUSTAINABLE
TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY ..................................................

399

I. INTRODUCTION
In numerous articles and papers, I have stressed in varying ways that
sustainable regulatory telecommunications policies require simultaneous
satisfaction of economic viability and political feasibility constraints, and
that satisfaction of these constraints is becoming more challenging for
regulatory regimes based on competition rather than monopoly. Some
articles have examined the sustainability of specific regulatory policies,
such as universal service,1 rate rebalancing, 2 and the effects of detariffing
on liability rules. 3 Others have broadened the scope of inquiry, looking at
sustainability problems arising from fundamental attributes of the U.S.
governance structure, 4 including efforts to retrench from public utility
regulation5 and to resist extension of common carriage obligations to
broadband access services. 6 Throughout this research, I have sought to
1. Barbara A. Cherry & Steven S. Wildman, Unilateral and Bilateral Rules: A
Framework for Increasing Competition While Meeting Universal Service Goals in
Telecommunications, in MAKING UNIVERSAL SERVICE POLICY: ENHANCING THE PROCESS
THROUGH MULTIDISCIPLINARY EVALUATION 39 (Barbara A. Cherry et al. eds., 1999).

2. See generally Barbara A. Cherry, The Irony of Telecommunications Deregulation:
Assessing the Role Reversal in U.S. and EU Policy, in THE INTERNET UPHEAVAL: RAISING
QUESTIONS, SEEKING ANSWERS IN COMMUNICATIONS POLICY 355 (Ingo Vogelsang &

Benjamin M. Compaine eds., 2000) [hereinafter DeregulationRole Reversal]; Barbara A.
Cherry & Johannes M. Bauer, InstitutionalArrangements and PriceRebalancing: Empirical
Evidencefrom the UnitedStates and Europe, 14 INFO. ECON & POL'Y 495 (2002).
3. See generally Barbara A. Cherry, Improving Network Reliability-Liability Rules
Must Recognize Investor Risk/Reward Strategies, in RETHINKING RIGHTS AND REGULATIONS:
INSTITUTIONAL RESPONSES TO NEW COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGIES 309 (Lorrie Faith

Cranor & Steven S. Wildman eds., 2003).
4. See generally Barbara A. Cherry & Steven S. Wildman, Preventing Flawed
Communication Policies by Addressing ConstitutionalPrinciples,2000 MICH. ST. L. REv.
55 (2000) [hereinafter PreventingFlawed Communications Policies].
5. See generally Barbara A. Cherry, The PoliticalRealities of Telecommunications
Policies in the US.: How the Legacy of Public Utility Regulation ConstrainsAdoption of
New Regulatory Models, 2003 MICH. ST. L. REv. 757 (2003) [hereinafter PoliticalRealities].
6. See generally Barbara A. Cherry, Utilizing "Essentiality of Access" Analyses to
Mitigate Risky, Costly, and Untimely Government Interventions in Converging
Telecommunications Technologies and Markets, 11 CoMMLAW CONSPECTUS 251 (2003)
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provide the foundation for a more general analytical framework for
designing sustainable telecommunications policies based primarily on legal
and economic analyses and incorporation of models and insights from the
political science literature.
Most recently, I have sought to further enhance this framework by
incorporating insights from complexity theory. Within the general
academic community, there is a growing recognition that complexity
theory, originally developed in the physical sciences, may also be
applicable to the social sciences. Complexity theory is based on the
distinctive properties of complex systems and provides a different
paradigm for understanding and interacting with complex systems.
Complexity theory is already influencing research concerning sustainable
environmental policies, and recent research
is examining its potential
8
application to communications policies.
In research foundational to this Article, Bauer and I assert that
complexity theory should be used to improve our understanding of the
requirements for sustainable telecommunications policies.
More
specifically, Bauer and I assert that if the telecommunications sector and
the legal/policymaking institutions are viewed as coevolving and complex
adaptive systems, then there are important implications for regulatory
policy. One implication is that law and regulation will have a diminishing
capacity to achieve specifically desired outcomes but will retain influence
[hereinafter Essentiality of Access]; Barbara A. Cherry, Misusing Network Neutrality to
Eliminate Common CarriageThreatens Free Speech and the PostalSystem, 33 N. KY. L.
REv. 483 (2006).
7. See, e.g., M. Beth L. Dempster, A Self-Organizing Systems Perspective on Planning
for Sustainability (1998) (unpublished M.A. thesis, University of Waterloo) (on file with
author); Robert J. Lempert, A New Decision Sciences for Complex Systems, 99(3)
PROCEEDINGS OF THE NATIONAL

ACADEMY OF SCIENCES 7309 (2002), available at

http://www.pnas.org/cgi/reprint/99/suppl_3/7309.pdf; J.B. Ruhl, Complexity Theory as a
Paradigm for the Dynamical Law-and-Society System: A Wake-Up Call for Legal
Reductionism and the Modern Administrative State, 45 DUKE L.J. 849, 855 (1996)
[hereinafter Complexity Theory Paradigm]; J.B. Ruhl & Harold J. Ruhl, Jr., The Arrow of
the Law in Modern Administrative States: Using Complexity Theory to Reveal the
Diminishing Returns and Increasing Risks the Burgeoning of Law Poses to Society, 30 U.C.
DAVIS L. REv. 405 (1997).
8. See, e.g., P. H. Longstaff, The Puzzle of Competition in the Communications Sector:
Can Complex Systems be Regulated or Managed? (Harvard Univ. Program on Info. Res.
Policy, Working Paper, 2003), available at http://www.pirp.harvard.edu/pubs_pdf/longsta/
longsta-p03-l.pdf; Barbara A. Cherry & Johannes M. Bauer, Adaptive Regulation: Contours
of a Policy Model for the Internet Economy 26 (presented at the ITS 15th Biennial
Conference on Sept. 6, 2004), availableat http://userpage.fu-berlin.de/-jmueller/its/conf/ber
linO4/Papers/Cherry_paper.pdf [hereinafter Adaptive Regulation]; Johannes M. Bauer &
Barbara A. Cherry, Transatlantic Conundrums: Lessons for Europe?, in ENCIP 12010:
COMMENTS AND CONTRIBUTIONS, EURoCPR 2006: SELECTED PAPERS (Verhoest ed. 2006),

available at http://www.encip.org/document/eurocpr2006_publication.pdf.
9. Adaptive Regulation, supra note 8, at 31.
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over possible, usually unpredictable, trajectories of sector performance.
Instead, greater focus must be placed on how to design policies and
policymaking processes that are more suitable for interacting with,
interpreting, and responding to the telecommunications sector over time. In
other words, greater attention must be paid to the adaptability of policies
and the policymaking processes themselves as they evolve with the
telecommunications sector.
10
This Article reviews the analysis in my previous work with Bauer
and then examines its implications for federalism, a distinctive
characteristic of policymaking processes, in the U.S. More specifically, this
Article shows that, from the perspective of complexity theory, federalism is
a patching algorithm that confers system advantages for adaptability
through diversity and coupling of policymaking jurisdictions. Such
diversity and coupling is important for adaptability of the policymaking
process itself by providing mechanisms for both experimentation and
stability that are essential for development of sustainable policies. In
addition, as a coevolving complex adaptive system, a federalism regime
needs to evolve over time. For telecommunications regulation in the U.S.,
other scholars have already noted a shift from dual federalism towards
cooperative federalism. This Article asserts that, as for sustainable
environmental policies, further evolution in the federalism regime is
required to improve the adaptive properties of the U.S. policymaking
processes to provide sustainable telecommunications policies. Such
evolution will require greater flexibility in the sharing of jurisdictional
powers as well as the utilization of new tools to enhance development of
robust and adaptive policies. An important implication of the complexity
theory perspective is that policies of complete federal preemption, and
particularly full deregulation, must be approached with great caution. This
is because such policies eliminate the adaptive properties of a more highly
patched and coupled policymaking system.
This Article is organized as follows. The next Part briefly discusses
the shortcomings of the traditional paradigm implicit in most policy
research for developing sustainable telecommunications policies in the
present environment. Part III provides an overview of the analysis in
Adaptive Regulation: Contours of a Policy Model for the Internet
Economy"I for creating a new paradigm based on insights from complexity
theory, upon which the present Article relies and expands to examine the
implications for federalism. 12 Parts IV and V describe the origins of
10. Id.
11. See id
12. Id. at 22-31. In order to retain a primary focus on the implications for federalism, it
is necessary to provide a condensed overview of the analysis in Adaptive Regulation. This
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federalism and its historical evolution in the U.S. Part VI describes recent
pressures for further evolution of federalism in the U.S. Part VII then
examines federalism from the perspective of complexity theory. It shows
that federalism is a patching algorithm that provides mechanisms of both
innovation and stability that can improve the ability of the policymaking
system to develop sustainable policy. This Part also reviews research
analyzing cooperative federalism and adaptive decision-making tools in the
context of environmental policy, with particular emphasis on the
implications for policies of federal preemption and deregulation. The
Article concludes with Part VIII, which discusses preliminary conclusions
for revising federalism in the pursuit of sustainable telecommunications
policy.

II. LIMITS OF THE PRESENT POLICY PARADIGM FOR
SUSTAINABLE POLICIES
For over a century, nations' telecommunications networks-whether
privately or publicly owned-were established and maintained under
monopoly regulatory regimes. Notwithstanding losses in some forms of
economic efficiency, monopoly telecommunication regimes have been
sustainable and relatively stable over long periods of time. Given the then
prevailing technological characteristics of supply, the economic conditions
created by legal barriers to entry also permitted the pursuit of numerous
social goals, such as universal service. Furthermore, once established, the
institutions that developed to oversee and enforce the regime-which, in
the U.S. consisted of federal and state regulatory administrative agencieshave persisted with only modest modifications.
In recent years, many nations have been transitioning from monopoly
to competitive regimes and their telecommunications sectors are
experiencing rapid rates of technological change. The attempts to transition
to competitive regimes in an environment of dynamic technological change
have unleashed tremendous forces for change not only on the providers of
telecommunications services but on the governmental, legal, and
policymaking institutions. These changing circumstances are challenging
nations' abilities to design and implement sustainable telecommunications
policies. 13 This is evident in the recent policy experience in the United
overview attempts to be sufficiently detailed so as to familiarize the reader with key terms,
concepts, and the underlying logic of the analytical framework for purposes of the present
Article.
13. In the U.S., FCC Commissioners-whether Democrat or Republican-have
emphasized both the need for and the challenge of developing sustainable policies in a
competitive environment. See, e.g., 2002 Biennial Regulatory Review, Report and Order
and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 18 F.C.C.R. 13620, 13955-57 (2003) (Copps,
Comm'r, dissenting); Review of the Section 251 Unbundling Obligations of Incumbent
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States, for example, where important policies such as interconnection or
universal service are undergoing continuous challenges and modification.
Bauer and I argue that these challenges are not just aberrations but
reflect a fundamental shift in the governability of the increasingly complex
system of communications technologies and services. 14 This reality
undermines the efficacy and appropriateness of the traditional policy
analysis
paradigm.
Under
the
traditional
paradigm,
policy
recommendations are developed based on optimization of some measure of
societal preferences reflected in an objective function, often a form of
15
efficiency, using models that are essentially mechanic and deterministic.
Bauer and I assert that a new paradigm of policy analysis is needed that
explicitly recognizes the evolutionary dynamic inherent in policymaking
systems and the systems they endeavor to influence. Complexity theory
provides critical insights for such a new paradigm.

III. TOWARD A NEW PARADIGM FOR SUSTAINABLE POLICIES
Bauer and I assert that constructive evaluation of a new paradigm for
policy analysis should start with a clear articulation of the meaning of
sustainable policy.16 Although often referenced, debates concerning
sustainable policies usually leave the term "sustainable" undefined. In prior
research, I have examined various dimensions of policy sustainability (and
unsustainability). Therefore, Bauer and I define the term sustainablepolicy
to reflect the insights and conclusions of this research. "More specifically,
sustainablepolicies are defined as rules that are politically adoptable and
for which 17
the desired policy goals are reasonably likely to be
achievable."
An important contribution of this definition to policy research is not
only its consistency with others' general discussions of policy
effectiveness,
but also its explicit reference to the conditions of
Local Exchange Carriers, Report and Order on Remand and Further Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking, 18 F.C.C.R. 16978, 17505-06 (2003) (Powell, Comm'r, approving in part and

dissenting in part).
14. Adaptive Regulation, supra note 8, at 5.
15. See generally G. MOR¢0L, A NEW MIND FOR POLICY ANALYSIS: TOWARD A POSTNEWTONIAN AND POSTPOSITlVIST EPISTEMOLOGY AND METHODOLOGY (2002).
16. Adaptive Regulation, supra note 8, at 5.
17. Id.
18. See, e.g., Johannes M. Bauer, Harnessing the Swarm, Communications Policy in an
Era of Ubiquitous Networks and Disruptive Technologies, 54 COMM. & STRATEGIES 19, 21
(2004) ("A policy instrument is effective if it is necessary and sufficient to cause a desired
or prevent an undesired outcome."); J.B. Ruhl, The Fitness of Law: Using Complexity
Theory to Describe the Evolution of Law and Society and its Practical Meaning for
Democracy, 49 VAND. L. REV. 1407, 1451 (1996) ("A law is fit if it achieves its policy.")

[hereinafter Fitnessof Law].
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"adoptability" and "achievability." As discussed more fully in Adaptive
Regulation, "there are numerous constraints on adoptability and
achievability-some foreseeable ex ante and others understandable perhaps
only ex post-which this definition is intended to convey."' 19 Of particular
relevance are economic, political, and legal constraints that relate to
political feasibility and economic viability of policy options. In addition,
these constraints must be addressed on a dynamic basis and inherently give
rise to various forms of inefficiencies. Part III.A of this Article summarizes
and achievability, their
the types of constraints affecting adoptability
20
efficiency.
on
effects
and
dynamic properties,
Bauer and I assert that the next step in evaluating a new paradigm is
to recognize that, as outputs of policymaking systems and inputs to systems
they intend to (or do) affect, "policies are outputs of and inputs to
coevolving complex adaptive systems."'1 This is because the distinctive
properties of complex systems have unique effects on adoptability and
achievability, which, in essence, limit human ability to predict-much less
control or manage-system behavior. Part III.B reviews key attributes of
complex adaptive systems 22and their applicability to the economic sectors
and policymaking systems.
Finally, Bauer and I assert that the heightened difficulties of meeting
the conditions of adoptability and achievability on a dynamic basis in
complex systems have profound implications for developing sustainable
policies. 23 Most fundamentally, this requires a shift from the traditional
paradigm that emphasizes static optimization of parameters to an
evolutionary paradigm that emphasizes adaptability. As discussed in Part
III.C of this Article, we must modify our expectations of what policy goals
and instruments can realistically accomplish, and policymakers need to be
willing to use and develop new research tools to enhance development of
more robust policy options.24 Furthermore, and most relevant to the present
Article, the policymaking system itself must be evaluated to determine
whether it provides an appropriate balance of global structure and local
randomness to enable innovation and order. From a complex system
perspective, this means evaluating the patchiness and coupling of the
system and its resultant adaptive capabilities. The remaining Parts of this
Article analyze the implications of examining federalism from a complex
system perspective.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

Adaptive Regulation,supra note 8, at 6.
Id.
Id. at 13.
Id. at 7-8.
Id. at 26.
Id. at 9-10.
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A. General Constraintsand Propertiesof SustainablePolicies
The design of sustainable policy starts with goal-rule compatibility
between an underlying policy goal and the means selected for its
accomplishment, so that an entity's fulfillment of the governmental
requirement will likely lead to achievement of the goal for which the
requirement was implemented. 25 Such compatibility requires not only a
rational relationship between a goal and rule, but an empirically justifiable
one as well. For the coexistence of multiple goals and rules, sustainability
also requires combinatorialrule compatibility; that is, compatibility among
any relevant combination of goals and their associated rules. This requires
the requisite "cause and effect" relationship among goals and rules so that a
combination of goals and rules do not work at cross-purposes, rendering
certain goals necessarily unfulfillable.
Some policies do not satisfy goal-rule or combinatorial rule
compatibilities-either initially or over time as circumstances changebecause they violate conditions for economic viability of the relevant
activity, firm, or industry. Wildman and I identify three general contexts in
26
which economic constraints may limit design of sustainable policies.
First, an economy requires a legal system that generally supports private
investment to ensure viability of the market itself. This requires legally
enforceable rules that support economic transactions, such as a private
property rights system and contract principles to facilitate exchange. 27 It
also requires limitations on government behavior to protect private parties
from arbitrary administrative action and expropriation of investment.
The other two contexts arise when government attempts direct
interventions to affect specific activities, firms, or industries in a system of
exchange. One is that change in policies must satisfy transitional
sustainability.This means that the effects of policy change on preexisting
investment, contracts, or conduct of private parties must not render the
25. Barbara A. Cherry, Designing Regulation to Achieve Universal Service Goals:
Unilateral or Bilateral Rules, in TELECOMMUNICATIONS TRANSFORMATION: TECHNOLOGY,
STRATEGY AND POLICY 343, 346-47 (E. Bohlin & S. L. Levin eds., 1998).

26. See Preventing Flawed Communications Policies, supra note 4, at 60, 97.
27. This is consistent with a growing literature that emphasizes the legal preconditions
for competitive markets, an exemplary discussion of which is found in Kovacic. See, e.g.,
William E. Kovacic, Institutional Foundations for Economic Legal Reform in Transition
Economies: The Case of Competition Policy and Antitrust Enforcement, 77 Cm.-KENT L.
REV. 265 (2001).

28. See generally Brian Levy & Pablo T. Spiller, A Framework for Resolving the
Regulatory Problem, in REGULATIONS, INSTITUTIONS, AND COMMITMENT: COMPARATIVE

STUDIES OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS 1 (Brian Levy & Pablo T. Spiller eds., 1996). The
framework developed by Levy and Spiller is based on foundational research by Douglass C.
North for which he was awarded the Nobel Prize in economics. DOUGLASS C. NORTH,
INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE, AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE (1990).
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desired commercial activity impossible or the firm or industry financially
unviable. The other is that policies must satisfy prospective sustainability.
This requires the coexistence of goal-rule and combinatorial rule
compatibilities for the affected commercial activity, firm, or industry on a
prospective basis throughout the time period relevant to achievement of the
underlying goals. Prospective sustainability problems may arise in the
absence of transitional sustainability problems, such as the imposition of
coexisting, conflicting rules.
Sustainable policies must also satisfy the conditions of political
feasibility for policy adoption and policy maintenance throughout the time
period relevant to achievement of the underlying goals. "[P]olicy choices
face political feasibility constraints in three different, albeit interrelated,
contexts . *...,29
First, political feasibility requires that a government's
intervention be constrained by those limitations on government action that
generally support the legitimacy of government itself. This means that any
government policy must consist of rules consistent with the "social
contract" reflected in its governance structure. 30 Second, a specific policy
option must be initially adoptable;that is a policy must consist of rules that
31
are adoptable under the circumstances prevailing at the time of adoption.
Third, a policy must have post-adoption stability. This means that a policy
must consist of rules that are able to remain in effect throughout the time
period relevant to achievement of the underlying goals. In this
3 2 regard, a
policy must survive subsequent efforts of policy retrenchment.
The mere multiplicity of the economic, legal, and political constraints
on policy sustainability poses difficulties for simultaneously satisfying
29. PoliticalRealities, supra note 5, at 772. See also Barbara A. Cherry, Regulatory
and Political Influences on Media Management and Economics, in HANDBOOK OF MEDIA
MANAGEMENT AND ECONOMICS 91, 95 (Alan B. Albarran et al., eds., 2006) [hereinafter

Media Management & Economics].
30. PoliticalRealities, supra note 5, at 774.
31. Kingdon's model of the policy decision-making process provides a powerful
analytical framework for determining the set of politically feasible policy options at a given
point in time, as well as for identifying changes in circumstances that may likely enable the
adoption of other options. In essence, the Kingdon model describes policy as the outcome of
coupling the problem stream (agenda-setting process), the policy stream (development of
policy options), and the political stream (consensus among policymakers) during a window
of opportunity. See generally JOHN W. KINGDON, AGENDAS, ALTERNATIVES, AND PUBLIC
POLICIES (HarperCollins College Publishers 2d ed. 1995). I use Kingdon's model to identify

the institutional factors contributing to adoption of differing rate rebalancing policies in the
U.S. and the European Union under their respective competitive telecommunications
regulatory regimes. DeregulationRole Reversal, supra note 2, at 362.
32. Post-adoption stability poses problems for U.S. deregulatory policies affecting
public utilities, particularly telecommunications providers. Political Realities, supra note 5,

at 760. They include the difficulties of retrenching from common law doctrines embedded in
common carriage and public utility law as well as the customer benefits of the traditional
monopoly regimes that bear welfare state characteristics.
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them all. However, the need to satisfy these constraints both initially and
over time bears special emphasis, as they give rise to properties
characteristic of complex systems. First, adoptability and achievability are
dependent on initial conditions and path dependence. Adoptability and
achievability of a policy (specific pairing of goals and rules) is dependent
on the circumstances prevailing at the time of (desired) adoption, including
the nation's existing institutional endowment and state of technology.
Furthermore, most change in public policy is incremental, requiring the
33
intervention of strong conjunctural forces for major policy change.
Second, adoptability and achievability must be dynamically sustainable.
This is because the ability of a rule to remain in effect over the relevant
time period, as well as its effectiveness in addressing the conditions for
economic viability, will be affected by changes in the policymaking system
and the economy.
The interplay among the numerous economic, legal, and political
constraints also has consequences for various dimensions of efficiency.
Given the emphasis of the traditional policy paradigm on optimization,
particularly of some efficiency measures, the relationship of efficiency to
sustainable policy also bears emphasis.
First, as a general matter, limitations on government power are
necessary to support both governmental legitimacy and long-term private
sector investment. 35 One important source of limitations on government
power in democracies is the purposeful imposition of organizational
inefficiencies on policymaking processes-such as separation of owers
and veto mechanisms-in order to check the powers of the majority.
Second, pursuit of a policy in a specific situation may pose tradeoffs
among political feasibility and economic viability constraints, requiring
33. PoliticalRealities, supra note 5, at 774 (citation omitted). This article shows how
differences in institutional endowments and historical telecommunications policies create
differing feasible sets of rate rebalancing policy options between the U.S. and the European
Union in the mid-1990s. See generally Deregulation Role Reversal, supra note 2. This
article also shows how the legacy of public utility regulation in the U.S. constrains the
feasible set of new regulatory models deemed adoptable in the U.S. See generally Political
Realities, supra note 5.

34. For example, current federal universal service support programs in the U.S. face
significant political and economic sustainability problems. See id. Furthermore, converging
communications technologies and markets and related recent policy changes are rendering
unsustainable numerous forms of "essentiality of access" broadband goals. See Essentiality
ofAccess, supra note 6.
35. Levy & Spiller, supra note 28, at 1-2.
36. Barbara A. Cherry & Steve S. Wildman, InstitutionalEndowment as Foundationfor
Regulatory Performance and Regime Transitions: The Role of the US Constitution in

Telecommunications Regulation in the United States, 23 TELECOMM. POL'y 607, 610-11
(1999) [hereinafter InstitutionalEndowment]; PreventingFlawed Communications Policies,
supra note 4, at 66-67.
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adoption of policies that are less economically efficient. For example,
universalistic benefits are more politically stable over time than
residualistic (e.g., means-tested) benefits, even though the latter are
economically less costly to society.3 7 In addition, a nation's institutional
endowment may require tradeoffs between equity and efficiency. For
example, under the U.S. Constitution, protecting certain values (e.g.,
speech in the Bill of Rights) is of higher concern than
freedom of
38
efficiency.
Third, combinatorial rule compatibility often requires tradeoffs
among differingforms of efficiency, such as between short-term and longterm efficiency. For example, entry barriers (e.g., franchises, patents) may
be required to enable development and deployment of new technology or
innovation, in exchange for which some period of higher prices by a
monopolist must be permitted. Without the opportunity for such profits, the
innovation itself would likely not occur. Furthermore, change in policy
to provide
rules to gain short term efficiency may also need to be sacrificed
39
efficiency.
term
long
for
investment
support
to
stability
B. Relations of Telecommunications Policy to Complexity Theory
To assert that telecommunications policies are outputs of and inputs
to coevolving complex adaptive systems requires justification for asserting
that policymaking systems and the economy are coevolving complex
adaptive systems. This Part briefly reviews key concepts of complexity
theory and distinctive properties of complex systems. It then reviews their
applicability to the economy and policymaking systems.
1. Complexity Theory
Complexity research studies change in nonlinear dynamical systems
and the factors leading to their sustainability or demise.4 0 In complex
systems, order arises spontaneously without any central planner and thus
from seemingly random elements. Complex systems also paradoxically
generate uncertainty. This dual ability to generate uncertainty and order

PoliticalRealities, supra note 5, at 790.
InstitutionalEndowment, supra note 36, at 619.
Id.; Preventing Flawed CommunicationsPolicies,supra note 4, at 68.
See generally ROBERT AXELROD & MICHAEL D. COHEN, HARNESSING COMPLEXITY:
ORGANIZATIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF A SCIENTIFIC FRONTIER (2000) (developing a framework
37.
38.
39.
40.

that synthesizes the mechanisms and principles of the complex systems approach); JOHN L.
CASTI, COMPLEXIFICATION: EXPLAINING A PARADOXICAL WORLD THROUGH THE SCIENCE OF
SURPRISE (1994); STUART A. KAUFFMAN, THE ORIGINS OF ORDER: SELF-ORGANIZATION AND
SELECTION IN EVOLUTION (1993); EDGAR E. PETERS, COMPLEXITY, RISK, AND FINANCIAL

MARKETS (1999); Fitness ofLaw, supra note 18, at 1438.

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS LA W JOURNAL

[Vol. 59

41
enables the system to experiment, innovate, and create stability.
Complexity theory is an umbrella term that embraces component
areas of study to address distinctive properties of complex systems. These
properties include: catastrophes resulting from discontinuity in sudden
jumps in system behavior; chaos resulting from unstable aperiodic behavior
and sensitivity to initial conditions; uncomputability because system output
transcends rules; irreducibility because system behavior can not be
understood by decomposing the system into parts; and emergence of order
that spontaneously develops as collective properties from interacting
system components. By contrast, simple systems are characterized by
predictable behavior, few interactions and 4feedback/feedforward
loops,
3
centralized decision making, and reducibility.
The generators of chaos, emergence, and catastrophe within a
complex system could cause the system to spiral out of control. Complexity
theory uses the concept of attractorsto represent the behavioral results that
flow from forces of order and disorder that might exist within a system to
regulate surprise generators of chaos, emergence, and catastrophe. Fixed
attractors are ordered with regard to a fixed point or repetitive cycle
lending stability and predictability to the system, but they potentially
crumble when faced with external forces of disruption. "These 'strange
attractors' lend flexibility and resilience to the system, but they are
44
inherently unpredictable given their susceptibility to surprise behavior
and extreme sensitivity to initial conditions.
When the community of fixed and strange attractors is assembled in
the proper balance, the forces of order and disorder are combined to allow
the system to adapt so as to remain sustainable. Such systems operate at the
edge of chaos 5-as their adaptability prevents degeneration or
explosiveness-and are referred to as complex adaptive systems.46 A
complex adaptive system may also consist of interrelated subsystems that
are also complex adaptive systems. Agent-based modeling, which describes
systems in terms of strategies used by agents or populations over time as
the agents or populations seek improved performance4 is a powerful tool
for designing or evaluating complex adaptive systems.
Another powerful concept utilized in the evaluation and design of

41. See PETERS, supranote 40, at 48.
42. AXELROD & COHEN, supra note 40, at 15-20. See generally CASTI, supra note 40.
43. See id.
44. Fitness of Law, supra note 18, at 1441.
45. KAUFFMAN, supra40, at 29.
46. AXELROD & COHEN, supra note 40, at 68-72; JOHN H. HOLLAND, HIDDEN ORDER:
How ADAPTATION BUILDS COMPLEXITY 4 (1995); Fitness of Law, supra note 18, at 1442.
47. AXELROD & COHEN, supranote 40, at 1-11.
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complex adaptive systems is fitness landscape. A fitness landscape-a
concept developed in evolutionary biology---consists of varying fitness
level potentials for an organism in a given environment, with peaks,
valleys, and planes of the landscape representing the fitness potential of
48
different combinations of behavioral schemata and organism structures.
Complexity theory uses fitness landscape as a metaphor to describe the
mechanics of dynamical system evolution and the resulting fitness of
system performance (however defined) to its environment.
A system moves around its fitness landscape through various
mechanisms. 49 One is the adaptive walk, which consists of incremental
steps uphill, downhill, or across planes based on assessing the effects on
the entire system of movement along the landscape. The adaptive walk is
efficient at finding the highest point on the fitness landscape in systems
with no interconnections or spillovers between elements; otherwise, it is
likely to become trapped at local fitness peaks. Another mechanism is
patching, which is a variant of the adaptive walk where movements along
the fitness landscape are made by assessing the effects on independent
patches of system components (i.e., decisions at subsystem levels) of
movement along the fitness landscape of those patches. A patching
algorithm improves upon the adaptive walk in more complex systems,
because it allows local configurations to change in ways that may be
suboptimal in the short term but alters the environment of other local units
that ultimately allows the overall system to achieve a better solution over
the course of a large number of moves. As a result, the system can
potentially move to superior, nonlocal fitness peaks. 5 1 A third mechanism
is jumps, which are nonincremental movements across fitness landscapes.
In natural systems, jumps may occur through environmental accidents or
sexual recombination. In legal systems, jumps can be made deliberately
through legal transformation, such as the development of new bodies of
5
law. 2

48. STUART KAUFFMAN, AT HOME IN THE UNIVERSE: THE SEARCH FOR LAWS OF SELFORGANIZATION AND COMPLEXITY 224 (1995).

49. See id.; David G. Post & David R. Johnson, "Chaos Prevailing on Every
Continent": Towards A New Theory of Decentralized Decision-Making in Complex
Systems, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1055, 1057-58 (1998); Fitness of Law, supra note 18, at
1416.

50. An example of the adaptive walk is the incremental change that occurs in case law
within a common law system. See FitnessofLaw, supranote 18, at 1416.
51. Part VII, infra, discusses the adaptive walk and patching algorithms more fully,
including the claim that federalism works in the U.S. because it is a patching algorithm to
solve public policy problems over a complex social welfare landscape.
52. Fitness of Law, supra note 18, at 1459-61 (describing the development of
environmental law in the 1970s in the U.S. as an example of a deliberate long jump).
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The concept of the fitness landscape is also instrumental in
understanding the interrelationships among complex systems. Importantly,
coevolving systems are those that are coupled; that is, when movement
along one system's fitness landscape alters the fitness landscape of another
system.5 3 Coevolution may occur either within a complex system
comprised of coevolving subsystems or agents or among separate, though
coupled, complex systems. An important insight from complexity theory
research is that the overall mix of patchiness and coupling of the system
components will determine the balance of (1) global structure for providing
54
order, and (2) local randomness for creating innovation and resilience.
2.
Economic Sectors and Policymaking Systems as Coevolving
Complex Adaptive Systems
Although they did not use the language of complexity theory,
economists have long studied the emergence of "system-levelAroperties
Starting
produced by the structured interaction of simpler components.'
with the insights of Adam Smith, economists have been interested in how
markets spontaneously create order and coordination from individual
actions.5 6 Recent strands of economic research have been influenced by
notions of complexity. 57 This research recognizes that uncertainty is
necessary for free markets to exist, as with all systems where a need for
change and a need for stability coexist. The primary vehicle for change is
competition, and regulation provides a global structure.
Similar themes are addressed by recent neo-institutional and
evolutionary economics. One important insight of these bodies of research
is that evolutionary processes and processes of self-organization need not
lead to efficient outcomes. 58 Evolutionary processes provide mechanisms
one. 59
for selecting a solution, but not necessarily an optimal or efficient
Moreover, complex systems can have multiple equilibrium states, whose

53. KAUFFMAN, supra note 48, at 215-24. As explained in Part VII, infra, coupling may
also occur among patches within a complex adaptive system. In some cases, as with the
policymaking system in the U.S., patches themselves may be complex adaptive systems.
54. PETERS, supra note 40, at 6.
55. AXELROD & COHEN, supranote 40, at 19.
56. J. Barkley Rosser, Jr., On the Complexities of Complex Economic Dynamics, 13(4)

J. ECON. PERSP. 169, 169-92 (1999); Warren J. Samuels, Hayekfrom the Perspective of an
Institutionalist Historian of Economic Thought: An Interpretive Essay, 9 J. DES
ECONOMISTES ET DES ETUDES HUMAINES 279, 279-90 (1999).
57. See, e.g., W. BRIAN ARTHUR, INCREASING RETURNS AND PATH DEPENDENCE INTHE
ECONOMY (1994); Rosser, supra note 56.
58. See NORTH, supranote 28, at 92-96; RICHARD R. NELSON & SIDNEY G. WINTER, AN
EVOLUTIONARY THEORY OF ECONOMIC CHANGE 14-21 (1982).
59. PETERS, supra note 40, at 119.
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6
efficiency properties may be difficult to compare. 0
There is also growing recognition that policymaking systems are
complex adaptive systems and that they are involved in a coevolutionary
dance with other complex adaptive systems in society, including business
and economic systems. 6 1 Furthermore, the overarching legal system
consists of recursive, complex adaptive subsystems that provide patchiness
and coupling for its resilience and adaptivity.
For example. Ruhl and Geu assert that the common law is a complex
adaptive system.6 1 The common law is sensitive to initial conditions, is
path dependent, is a self-referential system that replicates itself largely
through the process of citation to precedent, and is a provider of sources of
novelty that enable change, whether adaptive or maladaptive. Furthermore,
Ruhl stresses that the common law is a "system of patched jurisdictions and
various loose and strong couplings... [that] offers reasonable expectations
63
of evolving towards the region of complexity-to the edge of chaos."
Similarly, Geu asserts that the legislature is a separate and distinct
albeit interrelated, complex adaptive system apart from the judiciary.
Furthermore, Geu and Artigiani describe the U.S. Constitution as a
complex system within which the complex adaptive systems of the
common law and legislatures are nested. Similarly, Ruhl finds that the
U.S. Constitution creates a system reflecting patchiness (degree of dispersal
of lawmaking power) and coupling (degree of interrelatedness between
66
units into which power is dispersed) that is typical of complex systems.
Ruhl further describes policymaking processes that have evolved
within the overall framework of the U.S. Constitution. 67 More specifically,

60. MASAHIKO AOKI, TOWARD A COMPARATIVE INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS 197 (2001);
KARL-ERNST SCHENK, ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS AND COMPLEXITY: STRUCTURES,
INTERACTIONS AND EMERGENT PROPERTIES (2003).
61. Thomas Earl Geu, Chaos, Complexity, and Coevolution: The Web of Law,
Management Theory, and Law Related Services at the Millennium, 65 TENN. L. REV. 925,

926-34 (1998) [hereinafter The Web ofLaw].
62. Fitness of Law, supra note 18, at 1471; Complexity Theory Paradigm,supra note 7,
at 919; Thomas Earl Geu, The Tao of Jurisprudence:Chaos, Brain Science, Synchronicity,
and the Law, 61 TENN. L. REV. 933,941-42 (1994) [hereinafter Tao ofJurisprudence].
63. Fitness of Law, supra note 18, at 1472 (citation omitted).
64. Tao of Jurisprudence,supra note 62, at 942-46.
65. See id. at 988-89; Robert Artigiani, Chaos and Constitutionalism: Toward a PostModern Theory of Social Evolution, 34 WORLD FUTURES 131 (1992). Consistent with this

view of nested complex systems is Reynolds' analysis of the U.S. Supreme Court as a
dynamic complex system within the judiciary. See generally Glenn Harlan Reynolds, Chaos
and the Court, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 110 (1991).
66. See Complexity Theory Paradigm, supra note 7, at 891, 893; Fitness of Law, supra
note 18, at 1471.
67. See Complexity Theory Paradigm, supra note 7, at 925-26; Fitness of Law, supra
note 18, at 1474.
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he describes the development of the modem federal administrative statewhich is comprised of congressional delegation of lawmaking authority to
nondemocratic agencies whose decisions are insulated through legal
doctrines of agency deference by the judiciary-as an adaptation in the
lawmaking system's patchiness and coupling. Although the federal
administrative state may at one time have been the "fittest" system for
addressing the sociolegal problems of its day, Ruhl questions
whether it
68
remains the "fittest"system for the challenges of the future.
C.
GeneralImplicationsfor Sustainable Telecommunications
Policiesfrom a Complex Systems Perspective
We are now at a juncture where we can review the implications for
andimpemening
69
designingdesinin
and implementing sustainable
telecommunications policies
discussed in Adaptive Regulation. They can perhaps be best described
according to an outline of systemic sources of policy unsustainability and
responses required to address such failures. The primary sources of policy
unsustainability arise from: (1) initial improper design of the policy; (2)
after adoption of even properly designed policy, changes internal or
external to the policymaking system; and (3) the failure of the
policymaking system to adapt.
To address these sources of unsustainability, we need to modify our
expectations of what policies can realistically achieve. A first necessary
step is the modification of expectations of policies (i.e., pairings of goals
and rules/instruments) by shifting emphasis from static optimization under
constraints to adaptability. Policies should not be expected to achieve
specific outcomes. Nor should policies be expected to eliminate
uncertainty, for-as a complex system-markets have coexisting needs for
change and stability.
Instead, given the uncertainty and limited
predictability of the economy and particularly the telecommunications
sector, policymakers need to accept the necessity to experiment and closely
monitor the effects of adopted policies. Consequentially, policymakers also
need to accept the inevitability of policy failures. As a result, policy goals,
as well as the means of achieving them, should be expected to evolve over
time.
In addition to changes in expectations, policymakers need to be
willing to use and develop new research tools. Such tools include genetic
algorithms, exploratory modeling, and simulations to anticipate potential
long-term consequences of policy options and their robustness over varying

68. Id. at 1483.
69. Adaptive Regulation,supra note 8, at 22-31.
70. See PETERS, supra note 40, at 2-3.
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scenarios. In this regard, Timothy Muris, former chairman of the U.S.
Federal Trade Commission ("FTC"), asserts that government agencies need
to improve their institutional foundations for competition policy. This
should include investment in competition research and development, for
"[iln a world of greater economic complexity and institutional multiplicity,
building intellectual capital is essential
to understand new phenomena and
71
to exercise intellectual leadership."
Finally, persuading policymakers to change their expectations of
policies and to adopt new research tools is not sufficient. Policymakers
must also be willing to evaluate and modify the institutional features of the
policymaking system itself. Such an evaluation needs to consider whether
the patchiness and coupling of the current system provides an appropriate
balance of global structure and local randomness to enable innovation and
order. The remaining Parts of this Article examine these implications for
federalism from a complex system perspective.
IV. FEDERALISM AS AN INNOVATIVE AND DYNAMIC
POLICYMAKING SYSTEM
Federalism is a distinctive form of governance structure that was first
created in the United States Constitution. 2 "The concept of federalism...
describes the complex relationship between the states and the federal
government . . . ." Due to this complexity, there are many definitions of
federalism which vary as to the dimensions of the relationship that are
emphasized. 74 However, the concept in common among these definitions is
that "[a] federal system of governance arises when a group of equallysovereign states combine to form a union in which they cede
75 some
sovereignty to a central government and retain some sovereignty."
71.

Timothy J. Muris, How History Can Inform Practice in Modern U.S. Competition

Policy 61 (Geo. Mason Univ. Sch. of Law, Law & Econ. Working Paper Series, Paper No.
04-20, 2004), available at http://ssm.com/abstract_id=545184 (download paper under
"SSRN Electronic Research Network" link).
72. FORREST MCDONALD, Novus ORDO SECLORUM: THE INTELLECTUAL ORIGINS OF THE
CONSTITUTION 262 (1985) [hereinafter Novus ORDO SECLORUM].
73. Jonathan R. Macey, Federal Deference to Local Regulators and the Economic
Theory of Regulation: Toward a Public-ChoiceExplanation of Federalism,76 VA. L. REV.
265, 265 (1990).
74. Mark C. Gordon, Differing Paradigms, Similar Flaws: Constructing a New
Approach to Federalism in Congress and the Court, 14 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 187, 191
(1996).
75. Thomas S. Ulen, Economic and Public-Choice Forces in Federalism, 6 GEO.
MASON L. REV. 921, 924-25 (1998) (citation omitted). McDonald claims that a more
historically accurate statement is that the federal system in the U.S. was created "as a
compact among peoples of different political societies, in their capacities as peoples of the
several states." FORREST McDONALD, STATES' RIGHTS AND THE UNION 9 (2000) [hereinafter
STATES' RIGHTS]; Novus ORDo SECLORUM, supra note 72, at 280.
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Although federalism does refer to some allocation of sovereign
powers among the national government and states, the general concept is
not intended to denote a specific allocation. Rather, allocation of powers
may vary greatly among federal systems, as between the U.S. and the
European Union. Furthermore, and more importantly for the analysis here,
the allocation of powers within a given federal system may vary over time.
That the allocation of powers among the federal and state governments has
varied greatly in the U.S. throughout its history is well documented. 76 In
fact, the "shifting trends in federalism, between centralization and
decentralization, suggest that the Constitution is best understood as a
dynamic political instrument."
V. HISTORICAL EVOLUTION OF FEDERALISM IN THE U.S.
The allocation of powers among the federal and state governments
specified in the U.S. Constitution at the time of its initial ratification, and as
interpreted and enforced throughout the nation's early history, is often
referred to as dual federalism. Dual federalism is "[t]he idea that the state
78
and the federal governments operate in distinctly separate spheres.
During the nation's first century, federal-state relationships became
increasingly turbulent as the nation struggled with the difficulties of
keeping federal and state government powers restrained to separate
spheres. Escalating tensions among the states' varying economic interests
and interpretations of the appropriate scope of federal government power
finally reached a breaking point among the states of the North as opposed
to the South, culminating in the Civil War.
The defeat of the South that preserved the nation and post-war
amendments to the U.S. Constitution were significant events that triggered
reallocation of federal and state powers thereafter in the U.S. For example,
an unforeseen consequence of the Civil War "was the general public's
acceptance... of the idea that the [U.S. Supreme] Court was the sole and
final arbiter of constitutional controversies." 9 Furthermore, "[f]or the most
part, the Court left the states to do their bidding until after the turn of the
[twentieth] century," even to the extent of permitting
policies of
80
segregation and disenfranchisement of blacks in the South.
Yet, during the late nineteenth century, the Supreme Court embraced

76. See generally STATES' RIGHTS, supra note 75.
77. Keith E. Whittington, Dismantling the Modem State? The Changing Structural
Foundations ofFederalism,25 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q 483, 483-84 (1998).
78. Id. at 483, n.l.
79. STATES' RIGHTS, surpanote 75, at 224.
80. Id.
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some acceptance of a federal police power.8 1 During this period, Congress
enacted its first laws to regulate interstate commerce under the Interstate
Commerce Act and the Sherman Act, regulating railroads and creating
antitrust law, respectively. During the early twentieth century, the Court
also upheld federal laws placing some restrictions on states' regulation of
working conditions. The rise of federal government power accelerated,
however, after the Great Depression and World War II. Although scholars
disagree as to the significance of the New Deal legislation in marking the
decline of state powers, they do agree that greater centralization of power
82
In this regard,
in the federal government occurred post-World War II.
McDonald attributes a sinificant decline in state powers to key decisions
by the Supreme Court. The resulting shift toward increasing federal
government power, which became clearer in the post-New Deal period, is
often referred to as cooperativefederalism, which "relies84not on a division
between, but on a sharing of, federal and state authority."
Cooperative federalism evolved in a distinctive manner for industries
-such as telecommunications-regulated by administrative agencies. The
legislative delegation of regulatory power over industries to agencies was a
legal innovation of the state governments in the nineteenth century. Initially
established to regulate the activities of railroads, agencies were later given
regulatory powers over other industries such as telegraph, telephone,
electricity, and gas. Congress emulated the states by creating the Interstate
Commerce Commission in 1887 to regulate railroads, with the
Commission's jurisdiction expanded in 1910 to telegraph and telephone
companies. In the Communications Act of 1934, Congress created a new
agency, the Federal Communications Commission ("FCC"), to regulate
telegraphy, telephony, and broadcasting.
The allocation of power among the federal and state agencies under
the statutory framework set forth in the Communications Act of 1934,
which in relevant respects was virtually identical to the Interstate
85
Commerce Act of 1887, is usually described as a dual federalism model.
This is because the jurisdictional authority of the FCC and the state
commissions was based on a division between interstate and intrastate
communications, respectively. Over time, telecommunications regulation in
the U.S. has evolved to a cooperative federalism model, although scholars
vary as to when they deemed this transition to have occurred. For example,

81. Id.at 226-28.
82. Whittington, supra note 77, at 503. See also STATES' RIGHTS, supranote 75.
83. Id.at 229-33.
84. Philip Weiser, CooperativeFederalism and its Challenges, 2003 MICH. ST. L. REv.
727, 728 (2003).
85. Id.at 728.
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Noam states that:
During the era following the 1934 Act, public policy-makers were
under continuous pressure to reconcile the statutory fiction of
separation with the reality of integration. What emerged from these
efforts was a system of coregulation, in which both federal and state
agencies regulated the same facilities at the86same time.... The
coregulatory regime was essentially cooperative.
Weiser appears to consider the passage
of the Telecommunications Act of
7
1996 to be the defining moment.

VI. PRESSURES FOR A NEW FEDERALISM MODEL IN THE U.S.
"The future of federalism will respond to emerging political forces,
such as new political ideologies and economic commitments, that will not
replicate old patterns, but will rather react to their own historic logic. ' 88 In
particular, Whittington claims that "[t]hose basic forces that encouraged
centralization [by the federal government] through most of the twentieth
century have exhausted themselves, and the centralizing bias that was
present earlier this century has correspondingly weakened. Moreover, an
examination of emerging political currents
suggests that the forces of
89
decentralization."
favor
instead
may
change
Similar assertions have been made with regard to the administrative
state in general, stressing that too much power has become concentrated in
the federal government, which hinders adaptability:
A central lesson of the limitations of New Deal institutions is that
effective government services and regulations must be continuously
adapted and recombined to respond to diverse and changing local
conditions, where local may mean municipal, county, state, or regional
as the problem requires. This adaptability is just what the separate,
centralized agencies of the New Deal, and the doctrines authorizing
delegation of rulemaking power to them, lacked. The constant effort to
adjust programs, regulations, and doctrines to changing circumstances
has been the agencies' undoing.
With regard to telecommunications regulation, as early as the 1980s, Noam
claimed that "[t]he system of coregulation crumbled when the federal level
of government, spurred by technological, entrepreneurial, and ideological
trends, asserted itself and reshaped the industry structure in which the states
86. Eli M. Noam, Federal and State Roles in Telecommunications: The Effects of
Deregulation,36 VAND. L. REv. 949, 955-56 (1983).
87. See Weiser, supra note 84, at 728.
88. Whittington, supra note 77, at 524.
89. Id.at 503. The forces that favor decentralization include erosion of trust in the
federal government, revitalization of moral and institutional capacity of state governments,
and a new public morality favoring localization of values and acceptance of diversity. Id.
90. Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic
Experimentalism, 98 COLUM. L. REv. 267,315 (1998) (citation omitted).
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operated." 9 1 Examples of FCC actions include deregulating terminal
equipment, opening the long-distance market to new entrants, permitting
telephone carriers to provide enhanced and unregulated services, and
permitting pay-broadcasting TV. Noam attributes the unsustainability of
cooperative federalism for telecommunications regulation to the divergence
of goals between the FCC and the state commissions, 92 and that "[t]he
primary legal weapon that the federal government has used to achieve its
position [of dominance over telecommunications regulation] is the doctrine
of federal preemption....,93
In addition, Weiser identifies difficulties with cooperative federalism
under the Telecommunications Act of 1996. In this regard, Weiser asserts
that "[t]o date, the FCC has not conceptualized the Act's cooperative
federalism strategy in a clear framework." 94 Even more critical of the
judiciary, Weiser states that "the Telecom Act's cooperative federalism
strategy, the flexibility and authority that the FCC possesses in making
telecommunications policy also inheres in state agencies who act under the
oversight of the FCC. To date, however, the federal courts have failed to
appreciate this feature of the Act's cooperative federalism design...
"by
9
declining to give Chevron deference to state agency decisions. P
Yet, perhaps the most extensive research regarding the pressures for
change in the current cooperative federalism model of agency regulation
has been in the context of environmental regulation. Furthermore, much of
this research has been framed in terms of the need for sustainable policies
from the perspective of complexity theory. Given the similarity in approach
to the analysis in this Article, reference to the research on environmental
policy is incorporated in the following Part that examines federalism as a
patching algorithm.
VII. USING COMPLEXITY THEORY FOR EVOLUTION OF A NEW
FEDERALISM MODEL
Recalling that policies are outputs of and inputs to coevolving
complex adaptive systems, how can sustainable telecommunications
policies be created to enable both the policymaking system and the
economy to move to higher points on their respective fitness landscapes?
More specifically, for purposes of this Article, how should a policymaking

91. Noam, supra note 86, at 975.
92. "This divergence of goals occurred when the FCC began to embrace the concepts of
efficiency, competition, markets, and entry, while the state commissions continued to
emphasize equity and redistribution." Id. at 956.
93. Id. at 971.
94. Weiser, supranote 84, at 730.
95. Id. at731.
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system be designed to better enable the production of sustainable
telecommunications policies? This Part discusses how complexity theory
can be used to answer this question, with primary emphasis on the
implications for federalism.
A.

Recognizing Federalismas a PatchingAlgorithm

As with other complex adaptive systems, "problems of this sort are
computationally intractable, incapable of true solution by any known
methods." 9 6 Post and Johnson assert that "[l]egal theory would, we believe,
be enriched.., by paying additional attention to the study of various
algorithms derived from the study of 'complex97 adaptive systems' that can
successfully operate on problems of this kind."
From the complexity theory perspective, there are several kinds of
problem-solving algorithms, two of which are relevant here. One is a
simple trial-and-error method known as the simple adaptive walk. An
adaptive walk procedure is described as follows:
Aggregate system fitness is calculated for the initial configuration in
which the system begins, after which one randomly-selected element is
"flipped" [or changed] from state 0 to 1 (or vice versa). Aggregate
system fitness is recalculated for this changed configuration, taking
into account that the "flip" will affect the fitness contribution of all
elements on whom the flipped "spills over," i.e., all elements whose
spillover sets include the flipped element. If system fitness post-"flip"
is higher than pre-"flip"---i.e., if the new configuration has moved the
system up the fitness landscape-we change the system configuration
to the new configuration with the "flip" in place, and we repeat the
process with this new configuration as the initial configuration. If,
however, the change causes a decrease in system fitness-if the new
configuration has moved the system down the fitness landscape-the
change is rolled back, returning the flipped element to its starting
configuration, and the process is repeated from the original
configuration.
The adaptive walk is an effective algorithm for finding the highest point on
the fitness landscape for systems with no interconnections or spillovers
between elements. "In systems with substantial spillover effects, however,
the algorithm performs progressively less and less well. On these more
rugged fitness landscapes, the adaptive walk is increasingly likely to
become trapped on local fitness peaks-places on the fitness landscape
from which there are no steps leading upwards at all." 99
96.
97.
98.
99.
fitness

Post & Johnson, supra note 49, at 1059 (citation omitted).
Id.
Id.at 1075.
Id. at 1076 (citations omitted). In a system with no spillover effects, each element's
contribution is a function only of its own state. See id. at 1075.
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For systems with substantial spillover effects there is a different
algorithm called patching, which is a variant of the adaptive walk. 1°° The
patching algorithm is described in depth by Kauffman, and it was
discovered by Kauffman and his colleagues at the Santa Fe Institute. 10 1 In a
patching algorithm, each element in the system is assigned to a single
group of elements, or patch. As an element is flipped, the fitness of the
patch is recalculated. The individual element is permitted to move from one
state to another if, but only if, the effect of the move is positive on the
aggregate fitness of the members of its patch. Thus, "[tihe patching
algorithm seeks local, within-patch improvements in fitness rather than
global improvements. ... Each patch is allowed to maximize its own
fitness, independent of any effects on the fitness of non-members or on the
aggregate fitness of the system as a whole."10 2 Thus, patching is an
adaptive walk over a patched system.
However, an individual element's patch and spillover set may consist
of the same elements, have partial overlap, or be disjoint. If an element's
spillover set contains an element that is not also a member of the patch,
then the effect on the nonpatch element will not be incorporated into the
assessment of local, within-patch fitness. The measure of overlap between
an individual element's patch and spillover set is called its congruence.103
Thus, when an element's patch and spillover set are completely congruent,
then the spillover effects are internalized within the patch. But, when an
individual element's patch and spillover set are disjoint or partially overlap,
the patch and spillover set are coupled, creating spillover effects that are
not internalized within the patch.
Kauffmian has shown that this patching algorithm can, in certain
circumstances, dramatically increase the efficiency of the search for
high aggregate system fitness; an adaptive walk over a patched system
finds, in a given number of steps, higher points on the fitness
landscape for the system 4a whole than the same walk over the same
system without patching.
It is the destabilizing effects of the patching procedure-due to coupling, or
lack of complete congruence for all patches-that makes it more effective:
Patching is effective, it appears, because it reduces the tendency of the
adaptive walk to become trapped on suboptimal local fitness peaks ...
By moving to points lower on the fitness landscape, it can reach other,
higher configurations that it would otherwise be unable to reach under
100. In a system with spillover effects, "[a]n element's 'spillover set' consists of those
elements whose fitness contribution is a function of that element's state ....
Johnson, supra note 49, at 1078, n.56.
101. KAuFFMAN, supra note 48.
102. Post & Johnson, supranote 49, at 1078 (citation omitted).
103. Id. at 1078, n.56.

104. Id.at 1078 (citation omitted).
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the simple adaptive walk. It is, in other words, precisely the
systemicallYdlestabilizing effects of the patching procedure that makes
it effective.
Therefore, it is precisely because each patch is permitted to experiment
based on assessment of its own patch fitness-notwithstanding the external
effects on other patches and the system-that the overall system has the
opportunity to move to higher levels of global fitness.
Although predating the development of complexity theory, the courts
have similarly referred to the value of state experimentation within the
federalism structure of the U.S. Constitution. By far the most widely cited
reference is Justice Brandeis of the Supreme Court in his dissenting opinion
in New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann. Justice Brandeis states:
There must be power in the states and the nation to remould, through
experimentation, our economic practices and institutions to meet
changing social and economic needs....
To stay experimentation in things social and economic is a grave
responsibility. Denial of the right to experiment may be fraught with
serious consequences to the Nation. It is one of the happy incidents of
the federal system that a single courageous State may, if its citizens
choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic
experiments without risk to the rest of the country. This Court has the
power to prevent an experiment. We may strike down the statute which
embodies it on the ground that, in our opinion, the measure is arbitrary,
capricious or unreasonable. We have power to do this, because the due
process clause has been held by the Court applicable to matters of
substantive law as well as to matters of procedure. But in the exercise
of this high power, we must be ever on our guard, lest we erect our
prejudices into legal principles. If we
106 would guide by the light of
reason, we must let our minds be bold.
Justice Jackson expressed similar sentiments two decades later in a case
before the Supreme Court, with specific reference to the regulation of
public utilities by administrative agencies:
Congress may well have believed that diversity of experimentation in
the field of regulation has values which centralization and uniformity
destroy....
Long before the Federal Government could be stirred to
regulate utilities, courageous states took the initiative and almost the
whole body of utility practice has resulted from their experiences.
We must not forget that regulatory measures are temporary
expedients, not eternal verities-if indeed they are verities at all.... It
must be remembered that closer than any federal agency to those they
regulate and to their customers are the state authorities, whose
mechanisms are less cumbersome and whose principles can much
more quickly be adjusted to the changing times.
105. Id.at 1079.
106. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)
(citation omitted).
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We should not utilize the centralizing powers of the federal judiciary
to destroy diversities between states which Congress has been
scrupulous to protect. If now and then some state does not regulate its
utilities according to the federal standard, it may be a small price to
pay for preserving the state initiative which gave us utilities regulation
far in advance of federal initiative.
Weiser also stresses the value of state experimentation in his critique of
cooperative federalism under the Telecommunications Act of 1996. As
with Justice Brandeis and Justice Jackson, he does so without reference
to--although consistent with--complexity theory:
A critical advantage of a cooperative federalism approach is that it sets
forth a basic federal framework while allowing states to experiment
within certain contours.... Particularly for situations where there are a
number of alternative plausible solutions, relying on state agencies can
offer an alternative to th 8 risk of adopting a national approach that
steers the wrong course.
Moreover, Weiser asserts that the federal courts should give Chevron
deference to certain state agency decisions under the Telecommunications
Act of 1996 precisely because it would better enable enforcement of state
experimentation as Congress (he argues) intended. "By designing a
statutory scheme that assigns important interpretive authority to state
agencies, Congress recognizes the value of tailoring federal regulation to
local conditions as well as the value of experimenting with different
09
approaches."'
This similarity in expression of the same phenomenon by complexity
theorists and legal theorists has been explicitly recognized, with federalism
described as a patching algorithm for solving public policy problems. Post
and Johnson provide an exemplary discussion linking the same concept
between the disciplines of law and complexity theory:
Patching may be more than merely a metaphor for decentralized
political decision-making structures (though it is that and no less
interesting because of it); those structures may, in a sense, be
instantiations of the patching algorithm in the political realm.
Federalism may "work," in other words, because it is a "patching
algorithm," a means for solving public policy problems defined over a
most complex "social welfare landscape.. .."
Justice Brandeis memorably praised federalism as a means to allow
"a single courageous state [to] serve as a laboratory... without risk to
the rest of the country"; it may well be, however, that it is of some
systemic value that some 'local experiments' do pose risks to other

107. Fed. Power Comm'n v. E. Ohio Gas Co., 338 U.S. 464, 488-89 (1950) (Jackson, J.,
dissenting).
108. Weiser, supranote 84, at 729.
109. Philip J. Weiser, Chevron, Cooperative Federalism, and Telecommunications

Reform, 52 VAND. L. REv. 1, 36 (1999).
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jurisdictions, causing those jurisdictions to confront (and to solve) new
problems1 fat permit new frontiers of the fitness landscape to be
explored.

B. Modifying Federalismfor EnvironmentalRegulation
Understanding federalism as a patching algorithm has been used in
research for purposes of analyzing the cooperative federalism model of
agency regulation in the context of environmental regulation. On a system
basis, environmental regulation is experiencing problems analogous to
those of telecommunications regulation. The most fundamental challenge is
the need for policy that enables sustainabledevelopment:
The prevailing definition of sustainable development at the
international level comes from the 1987 Brundtland Report of the
World Commission on Environment and Development: "[A] process
of change in which the exploitation of resources, the direction of
investments, the orientation of technological development and
institutional change are all in harmony and enhance bpth current and
future potential to meet human needs and aspirations."
A policy of sustainable development is intendedly intertemporal as it
requires meeting "the needs of the present without12 compromising the
ability of future generations to meet their own needs."'
With regard to the current model of cooperative federalism, Ruhl
claims that the federal administrative state has evolved too far in
centralizing power in the federal government so that the level of patchiness
and coupling is too low.1 1 3 He asserts that the two most visible mechanisms
by which this has occurred are the expansion of the federal power to
regulate interstate commerce and the erosion of the nondelegation doctrine.
With specific reference to complexity theory concepts, Ruhl states:
With each further reduction in the number of patches of power, and
with each disconnection of couplings between those patches, we draw
ourselves further from the edge of chaos and closer to a brittle,
nonresilient order. While we may find comfort in the apparent
predictability of that state, we will face an increasingly ominous threat
of a major catastrophe....

110. Post & Johnson, supra note 49, at 1090-92 (citing New State Ice Co., 285 U.S. at
311 (Brandeis, J., dissenting)).
111. J.B. Ruhl, Thinking of Environmental Law as a Complex Adaptive System: How to
Clean Up the Environment by Making a Mess of EnvironmentalLaw, 34 Hous. L. REv. 933,
993 (1997) (quoting WORLD COMM'N ON ENV'T & DEV., OUR COMMON FUTURE 46 (1987))
[hereinafter Environmental Law].
112. J.B. Ruhl, Sustainable Development: A Five-Dimensional Algorithm for
Environmental Law, 18 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 31, 38 (1999) (quoting WORLD COMM'N ON ENvT.
& DEv., OUR COMMON FUTURE 43 (1987)) [hereinafter SustainableDevelopment].
113. Fitness ofLaw, supranote 18, at 1488.
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So, what motivates the intense fear of a patchier, more coupled
lawmaking environment.

. .

is that the states . . .will inherently

compete with one another for economic domination, and thus will
make poorer choices than will the federal administrative organism on
questions of national policy significance....
Even accepting ... that the administrative state was at one time the

'fittest' system for tackling the sociolegal problems of its day, there is
every reason to believe that the premises upon which it was designed
are no longer true. Through competition, cooperation, and coevolution,
the other species in the sociolegal ecosystem have adapted to the
federal administrative state: they have absorbed its policies, dealt with
where opportunities
its problems, suffered at its hands, and prospered
114
arose. In other words, they have evolved.
Ruhl does offer several recommendations. First, "[a]ll we have learned
from Complexity Theory... points in the direction of relaxing the grip of
federal administrative control of the lawmaking process. ' 15 Second,
"[w]hereas now our options are national versus state politics, greater
reliance on interstate compacts and other forms of regional organizations of
states will be necessary in order to adjust the levels of patchiness and
coupledness that are available for responding to each challenge." 1 6 Thus,
Ruhl recommends a shift in power from the federal government towards
state patches, and furthermore, that new patches consisting of groups of
state patches should be considered. Such changes would add a new level of
patching between the state patches and the federal government as well as
more coupling mechanisms.
In addition to altering the patching and coupling of the current form
of cooperative federalism, Ruhl advocates an alternative approach to
decision making within and among patches known as adaptive
management.117 "[T]he command-and-control model carried out through
so-called cooperative federalism. .

.

. has proven to be a tremendously

nonadaptive process, as decisions, once made, tend to lock into place....
emerging increasingly at many.118different levels of
The alternative approach
.....
With adaptive
decision making is known as adaptive management.
management, the decision-making process is open to continuous change
and based on a continuous input of information and analysis."19 This, in
turn, will require the use of tools comprised of adaptive optimization
algorithms:
Optimization across a fitness landscape involves using optimizing
114. Id.at 1480-83.
115. Id.at 1490.
116. Id.at 1488 (citation omitted).
117. EnvironmentalLaw, supra note 111, at 996.

118. Id.(citation omitted).
119. Id.(citation omitted).
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search algorithms not only to control for direction, but also to test the
fitness of different system component combinations and adapt to the
results continuously. The system's optimization algorithm must be
adaptive, moreover, because the systems with which it interacts are
evolving in their own searches for the most fit solutions.... Complex,
adaptive, evolutionary systems incorporate algorithmic decision
making tools that allow adaptive long-tern 120fitness optimization
through repeated reevaluation of system design.
Such tools will need to be interdisciplinary, require extensive and reliable
information, and utilize parameters that are interrelated and coevolve over
time. Examples include scenario building, positional analysis to generate
sustainability
assessment
maps,
and
computer-based
modeling
techniques.
C. ComparingModels of Policy Reform
Some options under debate for telecommunications policy reform
constitute an extreme reconfiguration of federalism-deregulation through
federal preemption. Ruhl has also analyzed the appropriateness of
deregulation in the context of environmental regulation from a complex
system perspective. His analysis provides insights for considering the use
of deregulatory policies for telecommunications.
More specifically, Ruhl uses the complexity theory perspective to
discuss the shortcomings of two dominant conflicting reform modelsincremental change and wholesale deregulation-with regard to the
Endangered Species Act ("ESA"). 122 The primary shortcoming of the
incremental reform model is that it "puts all the emphasis on law in a static
state, refusing to experiment not only with law, but also with other social
problem-solving systems. ' 123 The current ESA constrains "the boundaries
of the fitness landscape for ecosystem conservation policies and limit[s] us
to walking across that boxed-in landscape in search of fitter solutions....
Walking the landscape within a tightly defined niche can lead to temporary
124
fixes; real reform requires breaking out of the box."'
Ruhl asserts that the shortcoming of deregulatory reform is (perhaps
counterintuitively) similar to that of incremental reform. This is because:
The deregulation model puts all the emphasis on the other social
problem-solving systems, using law only as an adjunct for putting
them in motion. The problem with the deregulation model, therefore, is
120. SustainableDevelopment, supra note 112, at 54-55 (citations omitted).
121. Id. at 60-63 (Ruhl develops a five-dimensional algorithm for sustainable
development environmental policy, which seeks to optimize the three parameters of
environment, economy, and equity over the two dimensions of time and geography).
122. EnvironmentalLaw, supranote 111, at 976.
123. Id. at 979 (citation omitted).
124. Id. at 978.
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that it prevents us, just as much as does the incrementalist model, from
deliberately trying to make long jumps [across the fitness landscape]
through focused legal reform. In short, neither of the prevailing reform
models p2e rmits us to think of environmental law as a complex adaptive
system.
Ruhl's reasoning for this assertion is particularly compelling for
consideration of deregulatory telecommunications policies as it addresses
arguments in favor of deregulation similar to those raised in
telecommunications policy debates-not the least of which is the belief that
the current federal statutory law is the problem:
The fundamental mistake of the deregulation approach is that it is
based on the same linear-causal problem solving approach that has
shaped the ESA itself. The premise is that the ESA is not simply part
of the problem, but that it is the problem. What is abundantly certain,
however, is that it is delusional to believe that deregulation will
somehow turn back the clock to a time when neither ecosystem
degradation pressures nor property rights concerns were acutely in
conflict as they are today. The fact that the ESA is not effectively
resolving that conflict does not mean that it has caused the conflict or
that reeling in the ESA will move us back along the time line over
which the conflict has evolved. Indeed, there is nothing we can do to
reverse the nonlinear co-evolution of ecosystems, technology,
economies, and land use that has led to the ecosystem degradation
problem. All we can do is change, and we hope thereby to, prove, the
direction in which the problem-solving process is headed.
In a similar vein, Greve argues that, as a general matter, a form of
federalism that encourages competition among the states for citizens'
business is preferable in a world of high citizen mobility and far-reaching
technological change. 27 As with Justice Brandeis in New State Ice Co. v.
Liebmann and Justice Jackson in Federal Power Commission v. East Ohio
Gas Co., Greve's reasoning is expressed in terms similar to-although
without specific reference to--complexity theory:
Far from rendering federalism obsolete, enhanced mobility and borderleaping technologies render it more appealing.... Like the mobilityand-borders argument . . . the complexity-and-interdependence
argument cuts not against but for federalism, choice, and competition..
. If [Congressmen] seem less competent at legislating, that is largely
so because the central, collective optimization of social outputs over a
vast array of complex, interdependent, uncontrollable activities is
impossible. As complexities and interdependencies mount, so do the
learning costs and the rigidities attendant to centralized schemes. The
law of unintended consequences hits hard.

125. Id. at 979 (citation omitted).
126. Id.
127. Michael S. Greve, The AEI Federalism Project, FEDERALIST OUTLOOK No. 1, June
1, 2000, http://www.aei.org/publications/publD. 11716/pub detail.asp.
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We do not know what we should do when we do not know what we
are doing. Not doing it all at once and in every place seems a good first
approximation. National problems do not automatically demand
national solutions; instead, they demand a variety of responses that will
depend on local tastes, preferences, and circumstances .... Even in
instances in which a uniform solution seems sensible, it is often best to
allow that solution to emerg gradually, under conditions of
competition [among the states].
Greve's misgivings of national policy solutions, particularly before an
opportunity for competition among the states, should also inform
telecommunications policy debates regarding federal preemption.
D. Using Adaptive Decision-Making Tools for Policymaking in
General
Utilizing a complex system perspective to develop more effective
tools for policy decision making is a growing area of research. Although
consideration of specific adaptive decision-making tools for application to
telecommunications policymaking is beyond the scope of this Article,
merely altering the patching and coupling dimensions of cooperative
federalism, as with environmental policymaking, would likely be
insufficient to develop sustainable policies. Therefore, a brief discussion of
research concerning adaptive decision-making tools is provided here.
Research related to policy decision making emphasizes that the use of
classical tools to identify a single best model and a "best" policy are
problematic because they may not be robust across the range of possible
behavior of the complex adaptive systems they represent. In particular:
Complex systems often are characterized by uncertainty of a type that
strains the traditional methods of decision analysis, vital to the
systematic examination of policy alternatives.
[W]e often have information about complex systems different from
that assumed by traditional decision analysis. For instance, complex
systems often display regions of extreme sensitivity to the particular
assumptions, while at the same time exhibit important regularities of
macroscopic behavior.... [T]raditional decision analysis cannot easily
address the types of adaptive, evolving strategies tl% decision-makers
often employ when confronted by deep uncertainty.
As a result, new tools are needed to enable the development of more robust
policies, where "[t]he goal is to discover a policy recommendation that
holds for all plausible models of the problem, or which can be
demonstrated to be superior to all other options across this range of

128. Id.

129. Lempert, supra note 7, at 7309.
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plausible models."'
To develop robust policies, computerized modeling tools are
recommended. Bankes recommends exploratory modeling or exploratory
analysis, which uses agent-based models. 13 1 Agent-based models can be
used to recommend single policies or to provide "ensembles of policy
options all of which perform satisfactorily."' 32 Lempert recommends a
form of exploratory modeling, called computer-assisted reasoning
("CAR"). 13 3 CAR uses an ensemble of plausible models when there is deep
uncertainty about the future, combining traditional quantitative decision
analysis with narrative, scenario-based planning. "CAR combines the
human ability to intuit patterns and abstract a big-picture view with the
computer's ability to test detailed implications of facts over a huge number
of cases. The approach facilitates the assessment of alternative strategies
3
with criteria such as robustness and satisficing rather than optimality."1

VIII. TOWARD A REVISION OF FEDERALISM FOR SUSTAINABLE
TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY
From the discussion in the preceding Parts, it is clear that pursuit of
sustainable telecommunications policy requires realistic assessment of the
conditions for adoptability and achievability of policies affecting the
telecommunications sector. From a complex systems perspective, this
requires a paradigm shift in policymaking from the traditional focus on
optimization for a specific outcome to an emphasis on adaptability to adjust
to ever-changing circumstances. To use a paradigm of adaptability will
require policymakers to revise their expectations of what policies can
achieve, to be willing to utilize adaptive management techniques, and to
even adapt the policymaking system itself.
Embracing a paradigm of adaptability has important implications for
how federalism should be viewed for purposes of telecommunications
policymaking. Federalism should not be viewed as a structure for
policymaking that will generate some static optimal policy solution, but
rather as a policymaking structure that can provide adaptability for the
development of sustainable policies over time. As a patching algorithm,
federalism has the potential to improve initial policy design, to adapt
policies in response to changes internal or external to the policymaking

130. Steven C. Bankes, Tools and Techniques for Developing Policies for Complex and
Uncertain Systems, 99 PROC. NAT'L AcAD. Sci. U.S.A. 7263, 7264 (2002).
131. See id. at 7264.
132. Id. at 7265. Lempert uses agent-based models of technology diffusion to compare
alternative climate change-abatement strategies to address the problem of climate change.
133. Lempert, supra note 7, at 7309-13.
134. Id.at 7309.
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system, and to even evolve its own process over time in order to continue
to provide its adaptability function.
As previously discussed, federalism in the U.S. has already evolved
from a model of dual federalism to cooperative federalism, with increasing
pressures for further evolutionary change towards decentralization from the
federal government. This evolutionary trajectory is occurring both for the
U.S. policymaking system in general and for its application to
administrative agency regimes. As exemplified by research concerning
sustainable development policy in environmental regulation, we are now at
a unique point in history where further evolution of federalism can ariseat least in part-from conscious choice based on focused analysis.
Adaptive decision-making tools developed from complexity theory
research can be used to study the effects of alternative policy options,
including those that affect the structure of federalism itself.
In this respect, understanding the inherent advantages of federalism as
a patching algorithm enables the formulation of several preliminary
conclusions regarding pursuit of sustainable telecommunications policy.
First, as a general matter, telecommunications policymaking benefits from
the inherent advantages of a federalism mechanism as a patching algorithm
that provides forces for both policy innovation and stability. Therefore,
when considering specific policy options, it may be advantageous to
presume that regulatory power should be shared among the federal and
state governments. Given such a presumption, when considering alternative
policy options, those options that effectively reduce or eliminate such
shared powers should require greater justification than those options that
retain or effectively increase shared powers. Adaptive decision-making
tools, such as those discussed in Part VII, should be used to facilitate
comparative analyses of specific options.
Second, there are some preliminary conclusions that can be made
regarding specific types of policy reform that, by definition, directly affect
the federalism mechanism itself. For example, federal preemption affects
federalism by constraining or eliminating state government policymaking
authority as to the matter under preemption; in other words, preemption
constrains or eliminates the experimentation of the state patches. Federal
preemption has been defined in various ways depending upon the nature of
its design. For purposes of discussion here, the most relevant distinction is
between complete preemption and conditional preemption. Complete
preemption totally removes any state policymaking authority over the
matter subject to preemption. Conditional preemption:
provides that, if a state does not regulate according to federal
standards, its citizens will be subject to direct federal regulation ....
Conditional preemption thus forces the states to choose between...
implementing federal regulation or acquiesc[ing] in the displacement
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135
of their authority by the federal government.
Thus, the distinction is that complete preemption eliminates, whereas
conditional preemption only constrains,state policymaking authority.
There are several potential negative consequences of federal
preemption. There is a loss of innovation and future adaptability from state
experimentation. Federal preemption may occur before there has been
sufficient experimentation and learning that may indicate a superior policy
option. The result may be, as Justice Brandeis identified in New State Ice
Co. v. Liebmann, greater risk to the nation of an ill-timed national (as
opposed to state) experiment. The results of a national policy experiment, if
adverse, may also be more difficult to reverse or modify than those of state
experimentation. 36 Moreover, from a complexity theory perspective, the
potential negative consequences of complete preemption are likely to be
greater than for conditional preemption because the former forecloses more
state experimentation.
Therefore, not only should there be a presumption that regulatory
power be shared among the federal and state governments, but the federal
government should be particularlycautious about implementingpolicies of
complete preemption. This admonition appears to be particularly
appropriate for consideration of telecommunications-related policies given
that the network characteristics of telecommunications networks and the
rapid rate of technological change will tend to accelerate the speed and
scope with which the effects, good or bad, of national experimentation are
diffused throughout the nation.
Deregulation is a specific form of federal preemption. As with
preemption in general, deregulatory policies vary in the manner to which
they constrain or eliminate state policymaking authority. However, unlike
some other forms of federal preemption, deregulatory policies may also
constrain or eliminate federal policymaking authority. If a deregulatory
policy completely eliminates both federal and state policymaking authority,
it is often referred to asfull deregulation.As discussed in Part VII.C, to the
extent a deregulatory policy also eliminates federal policymaking authority,
deregulation shifts an even greater burden of addressing the ensuing effects
to other social problem-solving systems. In this way, the ability of the
overall society-of which the policymaking system is a component (or
patch)--to adapt has been reduced. Therefore, as with complete

135. Dorf& Sabel, supra note 90, at 425 (citation omitted).
136. A national policy experiment, by definition, has a wider scope of application than a
given state experiment. Therefore, it will directly affect a wider scope of activities in the
economy. In addition, reversal of a federal policy is usually more difficult than a state
policy. This is because state policymaking occurs only within a state patch, albeit with
spillover effects for the federal patch and other state patches. On the other hand, federal
policymaking occurs in a system of tight coupling with all the state patches.
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preemption, the federal government should3 7be particularlycautious about
implementingpolicies offull deregulation.1
Considering the implications of complexity theory for sustainable
telecommunications policy is essential for balanced discussion of policy
issues, whether pending or likely to evolve, which propose federal
preemption or even full deregulation. The insights from complexity theory
admonish us to consider such proposals with caution. We do have the
opportunity to use adaptive decision-making tools for a more focused
analysis of the likely impacts of such proposals as well as to develop other,
perhaps more robust, options. In so doing, we can begin the task of
adopting a paradigm of adaptive policymaking for sustainable
telecommunications policy.

137. Another reason for caution in implementing policies of full economic deregulation
is that such policies are based on the assumption that the legal preconditions for efficiencies
of competitive markets have been met. If this assumption is incorrect, deregulation may
create tremendous economic and political turmoil, as exemplified by the experience of
premature liberalization policies in nations transitioning from central planning economies.
See, e.g., Kovacic, supra note 27, at 288-89.

